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The tendency to choose lesser immediate benefits over greater long-term benefits characterizes alcoholism and other addictive disorders.
However, despite its medical and socioeconomic importance, little is known about its neurobiological mechanisms. Brain regions that are
activated when deciding between immediate or delayed rewards have been identified (McClure et al., 2004, 2007), as have areas in which
responses to reward stimuli predict a paper-and-pencil measure of temporal discounting (Hariri et al., 2006). These studies assume “hot”
and “cool” response selection systems, with the hot system proposed to generate impulsive choices in the presence of a proximate reward.
However, to date, brain regions in which the magnitude of activity during decision making reliably predicts intertemporal choice
behavior have not been identified. Here we address this question in sober alcoholics and non-substance-abusing control subjects and
show that immediate reward bias directly scales with the magnitude of functional magnetic resonance imaging bold oxygen level-
dependent (BOLD) signal during decision making at sites within the posterior parietal cortex (PPC), dorsal prefrontal cortex (dPFC), and
rostral parahippocampal gyrus regions. Conversely, the tendency of an individual to wait for a larger, delayed reward correlates directly
with BOLD signal in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex. In addition, genotype at the Val158Met polymorphism of the catechol-O-
methyltransferase gene predicts both impulsive choice behavior and activity levels in the dPFC and PPC during decision making. These
genotype effects remained significant after controlling for alcohol abuse history. These results shed new light on the neurobiological
underpinnings of temporal discounting behavior and identify novel behavioral and neural consequences of genetic variation in dopa-
mine metabolism.
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Introduction
Current knowledge regarding the neural basis of temporal dis-
counting derives primarily from lesion studies. For example,
damage to the human orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) (Berlin et al.,
2004), but not the ventromedial frontal lobe (Fellows and Farah,
2005), increases immediate reward bias, whereas in rats, lesions
of the OFC (Mobini et al., 2002; Rudebeck et al., 2006), basolat-
eral amygdala (Winstanley et al., 2004), nucleus accumbens (Car-
dinal et al., 2001), or hippocampus (Cheung and Cardinal, 2005)
bias selection toward immediate rewards. Such selection bias may
be viewed as a form of impulsivity (Evenden, 1999). Correspond-
ingly, polymorphisms in several genes in the dopaminergic sys-
tem, which targets these brain structures, have been identified as
likely contributors to impulsivity (Kreek et al., 2005). Although
previous human neuroimaging studies have investigated decision
making or the representation of value (Montague et al., 2006), to
date only two have directly investigated brain activity associated
with deciding between immediate and longer-term payoffs (Mc-
Clure et al., 2004, 2007). Following economic theories that posit
two separate valuation systems to account for the “irrational”
discounting of delayed rewards, McClure et al. (2004, 2007) iden-
tified limbically associated “” regions that are relatively more
activated by the availability of a proximate reward and fronto-
parietal “”regions that are active during all decisions between
sooner and later rewards. The  and  designations refer to the
two valuation systems: the  system, which is swayed by emotion
and overvalues immediate rewards, and the  system, which dis-
counts at a constant rate over time (Shefrin and Thaler, 1988;
Loewenstein, 1996). However, within behavioral psychology, in-
vestigations of temporal discounting have yielded results that do
not require competing visceral and rational selection processes to
explain immediate reward bias (Rubinstein, 2003; Zauberman
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and Lynch, 2005; Malkoc and Zauberman, 2006; Nussbaum et al.,
2006). Rather, alternate theories that address the purely cognitive
bases of temporal discounting (Trope and Liberman, 2003; Zaub-
erman and Lynch, 2005) propose that temporal discounting is
attributable, at least in part, to how decisions are cognitively
framed and that when proximate outcomes dominate conscious
thought, more impulsive choice tendencies result. An unan-
swered question raised by these theories is what brain areas play a
role in cognitively mediated bias toward immediate or delayed
rewards? To address this question, we used functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) and a modified delay discounting
(DD) task (Mitchell et al., 2005, 2007) to identify brain regions
associated with immediate reward bias or anti-bias. To maximize
the range of individual differences across subjects, participants
were either abstinent alcoholics (AA; n  9) or age-matched
controls with no history of substance abuse (CS; n  10; see
Materials and Methods). In each trial of the task, subjects were
instructed to choose between two amounts of money, a smaller
amount available “Now” (e.g., “$80 TODAY”) or a larger amount
available “Later” (e.g., “$100 in 1 month”) (see Fig. 1).
Results from a previous study, in which we manipulated en-
dogenous opioid levels of subjects engaged in this task, suggested
that basal frontal dopamine (DA) levels are inversely related to
the frequency of impulsive choices (Mitchell et al., 2007). More-
over, acute elevation of DA reduces immediate reward bias in
humans (de Wit et al., 2002). Therefore, in the present study, we
assessed genotype at the Val158Met polymorphism of the
catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT) gene, which plays a sig-
nificant role in regulating frontal DA (Chen et al., 2004). We then
tested whether variation at the COMT 158 locus significantly
predicted decision-making behavior and/or underlying neural
activity.
Materials and Methods
Subjects. Nineteen healthy, right-handed subjects (eight females; mean
age, 28.3  5.8) from the San Francisco Bay Area volunteered and were
paid for their participation. Subjects were either self-identified alcoholics
that were currently abstinent from alcohol (n  9) or persons with no
history of substance abuse (n  10). Five additional subjects were in-
cluded in the genotyping analysis but were excluded from the fMRI
analyses because of excess motion or equipment failure. All subjects had
at least a high school education, and the two groups were matched for
socioeconomic status, age, intelligence quotient (IQ), and years of edu-
cation. Alcohol addiction severity (before sobriety for the AA group) was
assessed via the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test [AUDIT
(Saunders et al., 1993)]. Mean AUDIT scores for the AA and CS groups
were 19  7 and 5  2, respectively, with scores 8 indicating problem
drinking. AA subjects were recruited on the basis of 2 weeks of sobriety,
and they reported an average 2.5 years of sobriety. Before participation,
subjects were screened for medical, neurological, and psychiatric illness
and for psychoactive medication. In addition, subjects were urine
screened for illicit drug use (Biotechnostix, Markham, Ontario, Canada)
and screened for alcohol use via breathalyzer (Lifeloc Technologies,
Wheat Ridge, CO) before each scanning session. All subjects gave writ-
ten, informed consent, in accordance with the guidelines of the Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley Committee for the Protection of Human
Subjects. Subject payment was not dependent on choice behavior in the
task.
Experimental paradigm. Subjects were first provided task instructions
and then given a brief practice session to familiarize them with the delay
discounting (DD) task. Subjects then performed the DD task within an
fMRI scanner, while we obtained a continuous whole-brain bold oxygen
level-dependent (BOLD) signal. Scanning was divided into eight func-
tional scans of 37 trials each (32 choice trials, and 5 “null” trials), in which
trial types were presented in a pseudorandom order that was unique for
each subject (total scanning duration of 1 h). At the start of each trial,
subjects were shown a cue instructing them how to select between the two
subsequently displayed hypothetical reward options, each consisting of a
dollar amount at a point in time (Fig. 1). We refer to these two alterna-
tives as Now and Later. The Later option was one of six “full” amounts
($1, $2, $5, $10, $20, or $100) at one of five future delays (1 week, 2 weeks,
1 month, 3 months, or 6 months). The Now option was a lesser amount
available “TODAY.” The percentage difference between the two amounts
was randomly selected from the set [30%, 15%, 10%, 5%]. The right–left
position of the Now and Later options was randomized across trials.
Subjects indicated their choice by pressing one of two buttons on an
MRI-compatible keypad. Instruction cues were one of four types: WANT
(W), DONT WANT (DW), SOONER, and LARGER, the latter two
being considered together as CONTROL (CON) (Fig. 1 B). In the W
condition, subjects chose the option they preferred. In the DW condi-
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Figure 1. Illustration of behavioral paradigm. A, The temporal sequence of events are shown
for one example W trial. Illumination of a fixation point (Ready) indicated the initiation of each
trial. The instruction cue was then displayed for 4.4 s, alerting the subject to the upcoming trial
type. The two options (Now and Later) were then presented while the instruction cue remained
on the screen. The specific dollar amounts (from $1 to $100) and the time of availability (from
the day of the experiment to 6 months later) varied across trials, as did the differences between
each option. The choices remained on the screen for 4.4 s; however, subjects had a total of 6.6 s
to indicate their choice after the appearance of the two options. ITI, Intertrial interval. B, Depic-
tion of the four trial types. The appearance of each option pair was preceded by a cue that
indicated trial type, instructing the subject how to select between the Now and Later options.
For W trials, subjects were to select the option they preferred. The SOONER (S) and LARGER (L)
trials served to control for activity that reflected objective comparison of the two options, rather
than subjective preference; these are considered together as CON trials. To assess the ability of
the subjects to control unintended motor responses, we included trial type DW, in which sub-
jects were instructed to choose the option they preferred and then press the button correspond-
ing to the opposite choice.
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button corresponding to the opposite choice. On CON trials, subjects
selected the side with either the sooner time point or larger amount of
money, depending on the instruction cue. Performance on CON trials
verified that subjects comprehended the task and were compliant with
task instructions. As described in detail below, the DW condition allows
for a gross assessment of motor impulsiveness, by comparing inferred
choices from the DW trials as a function of time with actual choices in the
W condition as a function of time. This procedure serves to rule out
spurious impulsive choice as a result of unintended motor responses.
Trial types were pseudorandomly ordered, with weighted ratios of 1:2 for
the W condition and 1:6 for each of the other conditions (Fig. 1). The
order of intertrial intervals did not vary across subjects; however, the trial
type, Later amount, Later time, and discount rate were pseudorandomly
selected on each trial. Because the choice condition followed the cue
condition at a fixed delay for each trial, we included null trials (five trials
in each functional scanning run), in which the instruction cue appeared
but no options followed. This trial procedure meant that subjects saw
each of the 120 possible choices two or three times, although not neces-
sarily within the same trial type.
Analysis of behavioral data. Behavioral data were analyzed using Mi-
crosoft (Redmond, WA) Excel and/or SPSS (Chicago, IL) software. The
proportion of Now choices relative to all W condition choices made was
calculated for each subject; this quantity, referred to as the impulsive
choice ratio (ICR), ranged from 0 (all Later) to 1 (all Now). A number of
other indices of impulsive choice were also calculated, as described pre-
viously (Mitchell et al., 2005), yielding qualitatively similar results (data
not shown). The task design does not allow robust determination of a
hyperbolic discount rate (k), thus k was not used as a dependent measure.
Reward preference in DW trials was inferred to be the nonselected op-
tion. On the basis of these DW responses, we calculated an inferred ICR
(iICR) for each delay time. Subjects demonstrated a significant effect of
delay time on ICR (repeated-measures ANOVA, p  0.001), with no
significant interaction between delay and group effects ( p  0.772),
consistent with our previous results (Mitchell et al., 2005, 2007). This fact
allowed us to calculate the absolute difference between the ICR and iICR
for each delay time and use the sum of ICR  iICR across delay times as
a gross index of motor error.
For single-factor statistical comparisons between subject groups, we
used unpaired two-tailed t tests for continuous measures and  2 tests for
categorical measures. For multifactorial comparisons, we used mixed-
design ANOVA, with group (AA vs CS) as a between-subjects factor. To
ensure the validity of parametric statistical tests, we applied an arcsine-
root transformation to ICR data before making statistical comparisons.
Analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) were used to assess the role of the
COMT genotype, after controlling for group effects (AA vs CS).
Image acquisition and analysis. T2*-weighted echo planar images (EPIs)
were acquired on a Varian/Inova (Palo Alto, CA) whole-body 4T mag-
netic resonance scanner. A gradient echo, echo planar sequence (repeti-
tion time, 2200 ms; echo time, 28 ms; flip angle, 20°) was used to detect
BOLD contrast. The sequence used one-shot k-space acquisition with a
phase map correction to reduce Nyquist ghosts. Coverage of the ventral/
orbital prefrontal cortex was facilitated by orienting the phase-encoding
axis along the rostrocaudal image dimension and sampling k-space in the
order positive to negative (De Panfilis and Schwarzbauer, 2005). This
served to minimize the effects of EPI phase-encoding distortion and
expanded rather than compressed the remaining distortion. Whole-
brain coverage was obtained by acquiring 40 3.5 mm coronal slices with
a 0.5 mm interslice gap (64  64 matrix; field of view, 22.4 cm 3), yielding
an in-plane resolution of 3.5 mm. Each fMRI acquisition was preceded by
20 s of dummy gradient radiofrequency pulses, to achieve steady-state
tissue magnetization and to minimize startle-induced motion in the
functional data. Coplanar T1-weighted gradient echo multislice anatom-
ical images (GEMs) were acquired for each participant. In addition, an
axial magnetization-prepared fast low-angle shot high-resolution (MP-
FLASH) T1-weighted image was acquired for use in spatial normaliza-
tion. E-Prime software (PST, Pittsburgh, PA) synchronized the stimulus
display to the fMRI acquisition and recorded subject responses via an
MRI-compatible fiber-optic keypad. A liquid crystal display projector
(Epson, Long Beach, CA) projected stimuli onto a backlit projection
screen (Stewart, Torrance, CA) within the magnet bore, which the sub-
jects viewed via a mirror mounted within the head coil.
fMRI data were processed off-line using a combination of in-house
software and the statistical parametric software SPM2 (Wellcome De-
partment of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK; www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/
spm). First, images were reconstructed into Cartesian space and sinc
interpolated in time to correct for differences in slice-time acquisition.
Data were then motion corrected using a six-parameter, rigid-body,
least-squares algorithm (Friston et al., 1995), realigning all volumes to
the first EPI volume, and smoothed with a 7 mm full-width half-
maximum Gaussian smoothing kernel. Each subject’s coplanar (GEMs)
and high-resolution (MPFLASH) anatomical images were coregistered
to the first EPI volume, normalized to Montreal Neurological Institute
(MNI) atlas space, and resampled to 2 mm 3 isotropic voxels. The result-
ing normalization parameters were subsequently applied to the statistical
contrast images (see below).
The functional data were analyzed in an event-related manner within
the framework of the modified general linear model using SPM2. Each
subject’s model included a design matrix with regressors of interest con-
sisting of  functions corresponding to the onset time of each experimen-
tal event type (ready, instruction cue, choice pair) convolved with a
canonical hemodynamic response function. Data were high-pass filtered
with a cutoff of 128 s and corrected for serial autocorrelations with a
restricted maximum likelihood algorithm using a second-order autore-
gressive model (AR2 plus white noise). Linear contrast images for each
subject were calculated from the regressor parameter estimates. The con-
trast images were then normalized into MNI space using the parameters
derived from the coregistered MPFLASH.
The main goal of our fMRI analysis was to determine which brain
regions show activity that predicts individual immediate reward bias
during subjective preference-based decision making. These were identi-
fied by first identifying brain areas that were differentially active during
subjective choice relative to objective choice trials (i.e., W  CON). The
W and CON conditions are equivalent in terms of stimulus properties
and motor response. This contrast can also be construed as identifying
areas that are differentially active during deliberative or effortful decision
making relative to more rapid responding. A simple correlation analysis
was then performed that identified voxels in which activity in the choice
contrast (W  CON) directly correlated with ICR across subjects. Sig-
nificant positive correlations were interpreted as an association with
Now preference, whereas significant negative correlations were inter-
preted as an association with Later preference. To allow direct compari-
son with previously published studies (McClure et al., 2004, 2007; De
Martino et al., 2006), we report results significant at p  0.001 (t  3.65),
uncorrected for multiple comparisons, with a minimum cluster size of
five contiguous voxels. To control for multiple comparisons, we con-
firmed that the reported sites all survived voxelwise correction for fami-
lywise type I error (  0.05; whole-brain volume), determined by ran-
domly permuting the ICR values and the (W  CON) contrast
parameter estimates in 8000 new analyses (Nichols and Holmes, 2002;
Nichols and Hayasaka, 2003) using the SnPM3 analysis package (http://
www.sph.umich.edu/ni-stat/SnPM/). For display purposes, statistic im-
ages are shown at a threshold of p  0.005 (uncorrected).
Genetic analysis. DNA extraction and analysis was conducted using
standard methods on samples obtained from all subjects who gave in-
formed consent (n  25). The Ernest Gallo Clinic and Research Center
Genomics Core performed genotyping of the Val108/158Met polymor-
phism of the COMT gene with PCR using TaqMan technology (Applied
Biosystems, Foster City, CA). Seven subjects were homozygous for the
158 Val allele, and eight subjects were homozygous for the 158 Met allele of
the COMT gene; 10 heterozygote subjects carried one 158 Val and one
158 Met allele of the COMT gene; genotype groups were not significantly
different with respect to age, education, socioeconomic status, IQ, gen-
der, or alcohol abuse.
Results
Behavioral data
Consistent with our previous findings (Mitchell et al., 2005,
2007), the ratio of Now choices (ICR) was significantly higher in
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the AA group than in the CS group (Fig. 2A). The group differ-
ence in ICR was not attributable to a failure to deliberate among
the AA group, because the average reaction times (RTs) did not
differ between groups (AA, 2187  142 ms; CS, 2146  177 ms;
p  0.88). Nor was the ICR difference attributable to greater
motor error in the AA group, because an index of motor error did
not differentiate the groups; in fact, we saw a slight trend toward
more motor error in the CS group (AA, 0.47; CS, 0.67; p  0.15).
A repeated-measures ANOVA comparing choices in the W and
DW conditions across delay times demonstrated no significant
difference between ICRs calculated from the two conditions ( p 
0.924), indicating minimal motor error. In addition, we did not
detect a significant interaction between trial type (W vs DW) and
group, although again we saw here a trend toward greater mis-
match in the CS group ( p  0.147). The AA and CS groups
performed equivalently on the CON trials, both in terms of ac-
curacy (AA, 96  1%; CS, 98  1%; p  0.59) and RT (AA,
1750  130 ms; CS, 1558  186 ms; p  0.38). We note that the
CON trial RTs were significantly faster than the W trial RTs
(F(1,18)  35.4; p  0.001), consistent with the expectation that
the (deliberative) W condition uses processes in addition to those
used during objective criteria-based decision making. We ob-
served no significant group by trial type effect on RT (F(1,18)  1;
p  0.39). Although the ICR group means were significantly
different, each group spanned a range of impulsiveness (Fig. 2B).
Neural correlates of Now versus Later preference
To localize brain areas that were more active during subjective
decision making, we first generated contrast images (W  CON)
identifying brain areas that were relatively more active when sub-
jects were deciding whether they preferred a smaller, immediate
reward (Now) or a larger, delayed reward (Later) than when they
were simply determining which option was Now or Later and
selecting it. Because our main interest was not in identifying
decision-making regions per se but in identifying areas that may
bias choice toward or away from immediate rewards, we conse-
quently entered the choice (W  CON) contrasts from each sub-
ject into a mapwise simple regression analysis. This correlation
analysis exploited the intersubject variability in ICR (Fig. 2B) to
identify differences in the BOLD signal associated with the indi-
vidual tendency to choose Now over Later. This approach obvi-
ated potential problems associated with simply comparing the
AA and CS groups (Pfefferbaum et al., 1997). Using the ICR of
each subject as a between-subjects statistical regressor, we found
a significant positive correlation between ICR and activity during
preference-based decision making in the dorsal prefrontal cortex
(dPFC), the posterior parietal cortex (PPC), and the anterior
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Figure 3. Selection of impulsive choice across subjects: fMRI correlation analysis. Brain re-
gions showing a significant positive correlation between activity during subjective Now versus
Later decision making and ICR. Brain activity indices derived from the subjective choice contrast
(W  CON); see Materials and Methods for greater detail. A, MNI space coordinates (x, y, z) and
t values for the PPC (top; 66, 42, 44; t  5.03), dPFC (middle; 22, 50, 44; t  3.79), and
PHG (bottom; 18, 4, 28; t  4). Criterion threshold was p  0.001 (uncorrected), with a
minimum cluster size of five contiguous voxels; results are shown at p  0.005 for display
purposes. These data also survived permutation-based voxelwise correction of familywise error
( p  0.05). L, Left. B, Corresponding correlation plots for each subject’s contrast parameter
estimate (an index of relative activity) versus ICR for the peak of each region identified at left;








































Figure 2. Behavioral results. A, Ratio of impulsive (Now) choices as a function of subject
group. The AA group made significantly more impulsive choices (0.74  0.26; *p  0.002;
t(17)  3.56) than the CS group. Error bars denote SEM. A value of 0 represents always choosing
Later over Now, whereas a value of 1 represents the converse. B, Standardized ICR for each
subject in rank order. Units are in SDs, with mean equal to 0. , AA; , CS.
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parahippocampal gyrus (PHG) (Fig. 3; see Table 1 for all sites
identified). The peak of the PHG locus is medially adjacent to the
amygdala, and its extent overlaps with an amygdalar region re-
ported to play a role in emotion-based, as opposed to analytic,
decision making (De Martino et al., 2006). In summary, in these
brain areas, activity associated with deciding whether to choose
Now or Later was highest in the subjects who were least willing to
wait. In contrast, we observed a significant negative correlation of
ICR with activity during subjective decision making in the right
lateral OFC (Fig. 4, Table 2). That is, we observed the greatest
activity in the OFC of subjects most likely to select the larger,
delayed reward.
Decision-making activity in the Now and Later region of
interest varies with ICR independent of group
The results of two further analyses strengthen the conclusion that
the correlations between BOLD signal during decision making
and individual ICR described above reflect true brain– behavior
relationships rather than group differences consequent to alcohol
abuse. First, for each region of interest (ROI), we used multiple
regression analysis to test whether ICR retained a significant pre-
diction of BOLD signal during decision making after controlling
for any effect of group. In each ROI, we found that a significant
correlation between ICR and BOLD signal remained after con-
trolling for group [standardized coefficients: dPFC, 0.651 ( p 
0.018); PPC, 0.628 ( p  0.011); PHG, 0.813 ( p  0.003); OFC,
0.845 ( p  0.002)]. Second, we tested for a significant correla-
tion between ICR and BOLD signal in the CS group alone. Again,
we found significant correlations in each ROI between ICR and
BOLD signal [standardized coefficients: dPFC, 0.704 ( p 
0.023); PPC, 0.651 ( p  0.042); PHG, 0.657 ( p  0.039); OFC,
0.916 ( p  0.001)]. Together, these results indicate that our
findings are not simply a result of group
differences in alcohol abuse history.
Comparing Now versus Later circuitry
in alcoholics and controls
Although our analysis demonstrates that
activity within the Now and Later ROI re-
liably correlates with temporal discount-
ing behavior, independent of alcohol
abuse history, if the relative activity in the
Now and Later regions distinguish AA
from CS, the potential clinical utility of
our findings would be enhanced. Direct
comparison of the normalized decision-
making activity in Now and Later ROI confirmed that activity
differences in these ROIs differed significantly between the two
groups (Later–Now: CS, 10.0; AA, 46.5; p  0.02; t(17)  2.49).
Main effect of COMT genotype on frequency of
impulsive choices
A two-way factorial ANOVA with ICR as the dependent variable
confirmed a main effect of group (F(1,19)  12.123; p  0.002)
(Fig. 2A) and also demonstrated a main effect of COMT geno-
type (F(2,19)  5.693; p  0.012) (Fig. 5). There was no significant
group by genotype interaction ( p  0.3). A post hoc contrast
indicated that the genotype effect was attributable to a significant
difference between the 158 Val/Val genotype and the other two
genotypes ( p  0.009); the 158 Val/Met and 158 Met/Met groups did
not differ significantly from one another ( p  0.126). The signif-
icant effect of genotype remained after controlling for the effects
of group (ANCOVA; F(2,21)  5.181; p  0.015), indicating that
the genotype effects on decision making are independent of alco-
hol abuse history. Distribution of AA subjects was not signifi-
cantly different across genotypes: 158 Val/Val, 4 of 7; 158 Val/Met, 5
of 10; 158 Met/Met, 3 of 8 ( 2  1.3; p  0.73).
Main effect of COMT genotype on fronto-parietal activity
during decision making
To test whether the COMT genotype also had an effect on BOLD
signal during subjective decision making in the distributed net-
work of brain regions identified based on robust prediction of
ICR (Figs. 3, 4), we performed a two-way factorial ANOVA (ge-
notype by group) with (W  CON) contrast parameter estimate
as the dependent variable. A significant effect of COMT genotype
on decision-making activity was found within two of the pre-
defined ROIs: the dPFC (F(2,13)  3.869; p  0.048) (Fig. 6, left)
and the PPC (F(2,13)  5.901; p  0.015) (Fig. 6, right). These
genotype effects remained significant after controlling for effects
of group using ANCOVA (dPFC: F(2,15)  3.834, p  0.045; PPC:
F(2,15)  5.911, p  0.013). We found no significant genotype by
group interaction effect in either ROI ( p  0.6 for both). No
significant effect of genotype on brain activity was seen in the
other ROI after controlling for effects of group. These genotype
effects were driven by differences between 158 Val/Val and
158 Val/Met genotypes in both the dPFC ( p  0.026) and the PPC
( p  0.005). Although our results argue against a dose effect of
the 158 Val allele, our sample size precludes ruling out such an
effect.
Discussion
Deciding for the future
Evaluating the costs and benefits of different behavioral options
and predicting which action is optimal is a critical function of the
Table 1. Brain areas demonstrating a significant positive correlation between ICR and the subjective choice
contrast image (W  CON)
Brain region Hemisphere MNI coordinates [x, y, z (in mm)] t value
Supramarginal gyrus (parietal lobe) Right 66, 42, 44 5.03
Cerebellum, posterior lobe (lobule VIII) Right 36, 52, 62 4.63
Middle temporal gyrus Right 56, 52, 2 4.46
Inferior temporal gyrus Right 68, 50, 12 4.24
Parahippocampal gyrus (gyrus ambiens, entorhinal
area, semilunar gyrus) Right 18, 4, 28 4.00
Superior frontal gyrus Left 22, 50, 44 3.79
Activated anatomical region, hemisphere, coordinates of the local maxima of significance based on the MNI coordinate system, and the peak t value are given.
The reported regions survived a threshold of p  0.001 (uncorrected; 5 voxel minimum), as well as a permutation-based voxelwise correction of familywise
type I error (p  0.05).
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0 t 6
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Figure 4. Suppression of impulsive choice across subjects: fMRI correlation analysis. The sole
brain region showing a significant negative correlation between activity during subjective Now
versus Later decision making and ICR. Methods and conventions are as for Figure 3. A, Right
lateral OFC (8, 36, 10; t  4.13). L, Left. B, Plot of each subject’s OFC Now versus Later
subjective decision-making parameter estimate as a function of ICR for the peak of the region
displayed at left; the peak regression statistic displayed in plot.
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CNS. In evaluating alternative actions, hu-
mans have a great capacity to integrate
outcomes across multiple timescales. For
example, we can overlook the short-term
deprivation of not spending money now to
reap the long-term benefits of compound
interest. However, the capacity to make
optimal decisions based on the integration
of outcomes at multiple timescales ma-
tures during development and ultimately varies greatly across the
adult population. Moreover, a number of neurobehavioral disor-
ders, including alcoholism, are characterized by a tendency to
overestimate short-term costs and benefits and underestimate
long-term outcomes. A better understanding of the neurobiolog-
ical basis of immediate reward bias during decision making may
thus lead to improved evaluation and treatment of such disor-
ders, which would have broad social impact. The present results
represent a significant step toward this goal.
Our data build on previous investigations of decision making,
by identifying brain areas in which activity during decision mak-
ing predicts individual preference for Now versus Later. Each of
the regions we identified has been experimentally linked to the
representation of value or outcome comparison in human and/or
animal studies; however, our data extend previous work by pro-
viding additional insight into the different roles each brain region
may play in the process of choosing between immediate and de-
layed rewards. Furthermore, we have determined that a func-
tional variation in COMT genotype influences impulsive deci-
sion making, an intermediate phenotype for use in studying the
neural bases of addiction (Reynolds, 2006), and its underlying
fronto-parietal activity.
Frontal hyperactivity and immediate reward bias
The rostral dPFC is active when humans decide between sooner
or later rewards (McClure et al., 2004, 2007). In addition, activity
in the dPFC is linked experimentally to representations of the
reward value of potential actions and the outcomes of past
choices during decision making in monkeys (Barraclough et al.,
2004). In humans, activity in the left dPFC is also associated with
“reward bias,” an enhanced tendency to respond to reward-
related cues (Pizzagalli et al., 2005). Together with our present
dPFC findings, these data suggest that heightened left dPFC ac-
tivity during decision making biases selection toward the greatest
short-term benefit. In our study, the immediate outcomes are
something or nothing, thus in the short-term, the Now option is
greatest.
Deciding between Now and Later in our task may also require
sustained information maintenance and manipulation in dPFC
circuits (D’Esposito, 2007). For example, to calculate accrued
interest during the delay for the immediate reward, a subject
needs to hold in working memory the Now amount, the interest
rate, and the duration of the delay to calculate the future Now
value, which can then be compared with the Later amount to
make a choice. We have previously found that AA subjects have
an interest rate criterion threshold threefold higher than do CS
subjects (Mitchell et al., 2007), a disparity that could result from
inefficient calculation and comparison. However, the ineffi-
ciency hypothesis conflicts with our interpretation of the OFC
activity seen in this study. Thus, an alternative explanation is that
identified Now regions may represent proximate outcome com-
parisons, whereas activity in the lateral OFC represents more
temporally distal outcome comparisons, with the relative
strength of immediate versus long-term choice outcomes pre-
dicting an individual’s selection bias.
Value and the parietal lobe
Like the dPFC, the PPC demonstrated activity during decision
making that scales with immediate reward bias. This is consistent
with the observation of McClure et al. (2004, 2007) that this area
is active during decisions between sooner and later rewards, and
with data linking the PPC more generally to numerical distance
calculation (Pinel et al., 2001). Moreover, in monkeys, the rela-
tive subjective value of competing alternative actions is repre-
sented in PPC neural activity (Dorris and Glimcher, 2004; Sugrue
Table 2. Brain areas demonstrating a significant negative correlation between ICR and the subjective choice
contrast image (W  CON)
Region Hemisphere MNI coordinates [x, y, z (in mm)] t value
Lateral orbital gyrus Right 58, 36, 10 4.13
Activated anatomical region, hemisphere, coordinates of the local maxima of significance based on the MNI coordinate system, and the peak t value are given.
The reported regions survived a threshold of p  0.001 (uncorrected; 5 voxel minimum), as well as a permutation-based voxelwise correction of familywise





















Figure 5. Genotype at the COMT 158 locus predicts impulsive choice behavior. The ratio of
impulsive choices as a function of genotype is shown. There was a significant main effect of
genotype at the COMT 158 locus on impulsive choice probability, even after controlling for the
effects attributable to group (AA vs CS; ANCOVA, F(2,21)  5.181, p  0.015). The 158
Val/Val
genotype was associated with significantly more frequent selections of Now over Later than
were the other two genotypes ( p  0.012), which did not significantly differ from one another
( p  0.144). Error bars denote SEM. m/m, 158 Met/Met; v/m, 158 Val/Met; v/v, 158 Val/Val.
Figure 6. COMT 158 Val/Val genotype predicts hyperactivation in the dPFC and PPC during
decision making. Parameter estimates indexing brain activity during Now versus Later subjec-
tive decision making as a function of the COMT Val158Met genotype within the dPFC and PPC
ROI (averaged across voxels). There was a significant main effect of genotype at the COMT 158
locus on BOLD signal in both regions, even after controlling for subject group effects (ANCOVA;
dPFC, F(2,15)  3.834, p  0.045; PPC: F(2,15)  5.911, p  0.013). The 158
Val/Val (v/v) geno-
type was associated with significantly greater activation in the dPFC and PPC during subjective
decision making (dPFC, p  0.026; PPC, p  0.005). Error bars denote SEM. m/m, 158 Met/Met;
v/m, 158 Val/Met; v/v, 158 Val/Val.
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et al., 2004). These electrophysiology data suggest that value com-
putation per se does not occur in the PPC, but rather that the PPC
is where the abstract relative values of available options are com-
pared and mapped on to motor responses (Sugrue et al., 2004).
The fact that we saw higher PPC activity in subjects inclined to
select immediate rewards suggests a few possible explanations,
first that Now-preferring subjects perceived a greater “distance”
between the two options, which translated to enhanced activity in
the PPC. Alternatively, as proposed for the dPFC, higher activity
may reflect processing inefficiency in this region. Given that a
similar pattern was seen in the dPFC, these areas may form part of
a functional circuit that cooperates in the process of numerical
comparisons that inform subjective choice.
Now versus Later preference: a role for the rostomedial
temporal lobe region
An area not previously identified as playing a role in Now versus
Later decision making is the rostromedial temporal lobe. How-
ever, our finding that rostral PHG activity during decision mak-
ing correlates with immediate reward bias is consistent with the
fact that during another type of decision making, activity in an
adjacent and overlapping site in the amygdala scales with individ-
ual susceptibility to counterfactual effects on decisions (De Mar-
tino et al., 2006). Our finding is also consistent with lesion data
indicating that the amygdala mediates the role of affect on deci-
sion making (Baxter and Murray, 2002; Hsu et al., 2005; Balleine
and Killcross, 2006), possibly by representing the affective value
of anticipated outcomes (Kahn et al., 2002; Yacubian et al., 2006).
Our PHG findings thus suggest greater negative anticipation (or
cost) of waiting for a reward in those preferring Now. If true,
impulsive decision making may be attributable not only to deval-
uation of temporally distant rewards but also to heightened neg-
ative expectations of waiting for outcomes, an explanation not
yet explored experimentally.
Lateral OFC and choosing to wait for bigger payoffs
In contrast to the above Now-favoring areas, higher activity dur-
ing decision making in the right lateral OFC correlated directly
with the inclination to wait for larger gains. This is consistent with
OFC lesions promoting impulsive choice (Mobini et al., 2002;
Rudebeck et al., 2006) and with OFC neurons playing a role in
value-based choice (Izquierdo et al., 2004; Roesch and Olson,
2004; Schoenbaum and Roesch, 2005; Padoa-Schioppa and
Assad, 2006). It is also consistent with lateral OFC activity repre-
senting relative monetary reward value (Elliott et al., 2003). We
speculate that the OFC preferentially represents more distal out-
come comparisons, or the integration of relative outcome com-
parisons across multiple timescales, possibilities not yet ad-
dressed in either humans or animals.
Our finding of reduced OFC activity during decision making
among AA subjects is consistent with the common finding of
OFC dysfunction in substance abusers (London et al., 2000;
Volkow and Fowler, 2000; Dom et al., 2005). Moreover, our data
indicate a specific dysfunction of the lateral OFC that may con-
tribute to the persistence of addictive disorders. Abnormal activ-
ity in the same OFC site was observed in a positron emission
tomography study of abstinent opiate and methamphetamine
abusers performing a gambling task (Ersche et al., 2005), suggest-
ing that abnormal activity in the lateral OFC when deciding be-
tween rewards may be a reliable addiction biomarker. Therefore,
determining whether this biomarker is an addiction vulnerability
or relapse risk factor are important future questions.
Ventral striatum: reward sensitivity, not behavioral choice?
We note that our analyses did not identify the ventral striatum
(VS), in apparent contrast to the recent finding of Hariri et al.
(2006) that VS responses to proximate reward stimuli predict
individual temporal discounting rates measured in a nonscan-
ning context. However, we also note that our analyses instead
identified brain areas showing activity during decision making
that predicts Now versus Later choices when those options are
relatively similar. Moreover, our task design controlled for effects
attributable to stimulus reward properties, including magnitude
and temporal proximity. Finally, we note that recent data from
McClure et al. (2007) show that VS activity during decision mak-
ing is linked to stimulus properties but not to choice behavior.
Thus, the fMRI signal in the human VS appears to represent
individual reward sensitivity (Knutson et al., 2005), rather than
reward comparison or choice.
COMT: cortical DA and temporal discounting
Our results indicate that genetic variation in COMT function
influences decision-making behavior and underlying activity in
brain regions associated with immediate reward preference. Spe-
cifically, individuals carrying the enzymatically less active 158 Met
allele of the COMT gene exhibit decreased immediate reward bias
and show less fronto-parietal activity during decision making
compared with those homozygous for the 158 Val allele. Such ge-
netically driven variation in COMT function and subsequent
fronto-parietal function may also contribute to other forms of
impulsive behavior (Cools and Robbins, 2004; Congdon and
Canli, 2005; Kreek et al., 2005). Studies linking COMT to alco-
holism have been equivocal (Ishiguro et al., 1999; Kauhanen et
al., 2000; Kim et al., 2006; Samochowiec et al., 2006; Sery et al.,
2006), although some data suggest that alcoholic subphenotypes
may associate with specific COMT diplotypes (Tiihonen et al.,
1999; Wang et al., 2001; Kweon et al., 2005; Enoch et al., 2006).
We did not find a significantly skewed distribution of AA subjects
across COMT genotypes; however, the possibility remains that
the 158 Val/Val COMT genotype may confer risk for an impulsive
alcoholism subtype.
The COMT 158 Val/Val genotype is also associated with poorer
performance on frontal-dependent tasks and greater frontal ac-
tivation relative to subjects with at least one 158 Met allele (Egan et
al., 2001; Blasi et al., 2005; Minzenberg et al., 2006; Winterer et al.,
2006a,b). Such results have been interpreted as processing ineffi-
ciency in frontal circuitry for the 158 Val/Val genotype (Tunbridge
et al., 2006), particularly during tasks that require maintenance of
stable representations (Bilder et al., 2004; Nolan et al., 2004; Tun-
bridge et al., 2006). However, the role of the COMT 158 genotype
in frontal function is not without controversy. In patients with
Parkinson’s syndrome, the 158 Val/Val genotype predicts increased
BOLD signal in the PFC and PPC and is associated with better
performance in a planning task (Williams-Gray et al., 2007). The
relationship between COMT effects on BOLD and frontal task
performance may reflect task-dependent sensitivity to frontal DA
(Nolan et al., 2004) and the inverted U-shaped relationship be-
tween working memory performance and frontal DA (Goldman-
Rakic et al., 2000).
A COMT 158 genotype by disease interaction is seen in Par-
kinson’s disease (Williams-Gray et al., 2007), but not in schizo-
phrenia (Egan et al., 2001), for BOLD and frontal-dependent
tasks. Moreover, Parkinson’s disease is characterized by selective
(at least initially) striatal DA depletion (Kish et al., 1988), whereas
schizophrenia is thought to reflect relative striatal hyper-
dopaminergia and frontal hypo-dopaminergia (Davis et al.,
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1991). In light of these data, a simple interpretation of our finding
of additive effects of COMT 158 and alcoholism history on BOLD
and frontal task performance is that sober alcoholics express rel-
atively more cortical DA depletion, which is COMT independent.
DA pharmacoimaging data pertinent to this issue remains con-
flicting and difficult to interpret (Cropley et al., 2006); however, a
marker for central DA activity [plasma homovanillic acid (Amin
et al., 1992)] is depressed in sober alchoholics independent of
COMT genotype (Kohnke et al., 2003), formally allowing for this
possibility.
In summary, we have identified brain regions in which activity
during decision making scales with individual tendency to select
smaller, immediate, or larger delayed monetary rewards. Because
activity in these areas differed in AA and CS subjects, these dif-
ferences may contribute to decision-making impairment among
alcoholics, representing an intermediate phenotype. Moreover,
the finding that the COMT genotype at the Val158Met locus
predicted both decision-making behavior and underlying fronto-
parietal activity points to a therapeutic target for 158 Val/Val indi-
viduals struggling to overcome substance abuse disorders.
Because regional activation during decision making predictive of
immediate reward bias did not divide neatly along limbic/non-
limbic structures, our results do not support the hypothesis that
immediate reward bias results from an overactive “hot” limbic
system relative to a cool reason circuit. Instead, our results favor
the idea that immediate reward bias is attributable to a stronger
influence on choice of neural representations of proximate out-
come comparisons and that, in contrast, lateral OFC activity rep-
resents temporally distal outcome comparisons and contributes
to the ability to wait for a larger reward. These results thus suggest
that cognitive therapies for substance abuse that focus on
strengthening neural representations of long-term outcomes
may aid in decision making during recovery.
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